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Abstract
In this chapter we provide an introductory presentation of normative multi-agent systems (nMAS).
The key idea of the chapter is that any definition of nMAS should preliminarily clarify meaning,
scope, and function of the concept of norm. On account of this idea, we focus on three definitions
and some related requirements for nMAS. For each of such definitions we propose some guidelines
for developing nMAS. Second, we suggest how to relate the concept of nMAS to different concep-
tions of norms and how norms can be used within the systems. Finally, we identify some specific
issues that open research questions or that exhibit interesting overlaps with other disciplines.
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1 Introduction
Normative systems are those in which “norms play a role and which need normative concepts
in order to be described or specified” [70, preface]. There has been in the last years an
increasing interest in normative systems in the computer science community, due, among the
other reasons, to the AgentLink RoadMap’s [65] observation that norms must be introduced
in agent technology in the medium term for infrastructure for open communities, reasoning in
open environments and trust and reputation. Indeed, normative multi-agent systems (nMAS)
revolve around the idea that, while the main objective of MAS research is to design systems of
autonomous agents, it is likewise important that agent systems may exhibit global desirable
properties. One possible strategy to achieve this goal is that, like in human societies, such
desirable properties be ensured by normative constraints: the interaction of artificial agents,
too, adopts normative models whose goal is to govern agents’ behavior through normative
systems in supporting coordination, cooperation and decision-making. The deontic logic
and artificial intelligence and law communities, for instance, agree about the structure and
properties of norms [38]. The nMAS community, too, has strong and obvious connections
with the development of rule-based systems and technologies.
Layout of the Chapter
It is widely acknowledged that normative concepts can play an important role in MAS and
many themes and methods have obtained a reasonable degree of consensus. However, there
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are still different views in regard to some fundamental research questions, such as the kind
of norms to be used, or the way to use them.
The layout of the chapter is as follows:
In Section 2 we will offer a general discussion of basic theoretical assumptions behind any
meaningful usage of norms in MAS.
In Section 3 we will discuss three definitions of nMAS, one emerging from social sciences
and two that revise the ones proposed in [20, 23, 18, 19] and that emerged from past
NorMAS workshops. Notice that we will not assume that the social perspective of norms
be necessarily contrasted with the legal one. In fact, these two views are often taken to be
symmetrically opposed: in the social paradigm norms fall within a bottom-up approach to
normativity that is based on the concept of norm emergence; in the legal paradigm norms
are mostly defined within a top-down, authority-based and institutionalised perspective.
While it is far from obvious that norm emergence does not play any role in legal systems
[28], we prefer framing the definitions of nMAS in a slightly different way: the key problem
is clarifying what norms are supposed to do in MAS and what normative strategy is best
suited to govern agents’ social interaction.
In Section 5 we will address some open (and somehow overlooked) research issues in MAS
and show that they are relevant for nMAS and for establishing interesting links with
other disciplines.
2 A General Picture: The Nature of Norms
In order to determine the possible roles of norms in MAS we will have a look at the position
of norms in human society. In a very general sense norms regulate the interactions between
an individual and the society (i.e., other individuals or groups of individuals). A consequence
of this very simple statement is that norms would not make any sense if we consider only
one individual in an environment (which possibly might contain other individuals, but which
are not distinguished from other environmental elements). Of course, this individual might
be influenced by the environment. It can be constrained by physical properties or enticed by
them to perform or avoid certain (sequences of) actions. However, patterns of behavior that
emerge from this situation would not be called norms, but rather habits.
The second aspect of norms is that they regulate the interactions between (groups of)
individuals as part of and through the social reality. Although this is not the place to expand
very much on the nature of social reality (see, e.g., [88] for some analysis) we will say a
few words about it as far as it determines the nature of norms. In short social reality is
a reality that is created and exists solely by a kind of joint agreement of the individuals
in a society. It therefore does not exist without there being individuals (like the physical
reality), but it always exists in some form when there are two or more individuals that are
interdependent. Some famous examples of elements of social reality are concepts such as
money and ownership. Because the elements of social reality only exist virtually (and by
virtue of agreement) they need to be connected in some way to the physical reality in order
for them to be observable, manipulable, changeable, etc. Thus money is represented by coins
and banknotes and ownership is represented by documents. However, this relation is not
completely fixed and static. For example, centuries ago only coins of a certain material (gold
or copper) counted as money. Later promissary notes of certain individuals also counted as
money. Nowadays most money is only represented as data in a computer.
By the mere fact that norms are part of social reality they are also created by mutual
agreement and thus their nature is not entirely fixed but malleable by mutual agreement
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as well. However, as with most concepts of social reality the meaning and nature of norms
is not completely random. There is a so-called core part which is (relatively) stable and a
penumbra which might be more flexible. We will come back to this later when talking about
different types of norms.
First, let’s see what further consequences follow from the fact that norms are part of
social reality. Because they are a concept of social reality they do not physically constrain
the relations between individuals. Therefore it is possible to violate them. Most people
would even argue that this is a fundamental property of norms. This does not have to be a
property of the representation (or implementation) of the norm in the physical reality. If
a prohibition to ride a train without a ticket is represented by a fence and a door to enter
the train platform which can only be opened using a (valid) train ticket then it becomes
physically impossible to violate this norm. However, not all norms can be implemented
in physical reality in a way that the violation of them is impossible1. To argue this point,
let’s first come back to the main claim that norms regulate the interactions between an
individual and other individuals in a society. These interactions between individuals consist
of actions performed by the individuals that influence the behavior or result of actions of the
others. Thus there are mainly two ways to regulate these interactions. First one can use
prohibitions of actions that an individual might want to perform (because they are considered
to interfere in a negative way with the actions of other individuals). Secondly, one can resort
to obligations ordering an individual to perform at a certain moment an action (because it is
considered necessary for the success of the interaction).
The second type of regulation of behavior cannot be implemented by a constraint in the
environment, and so agents’ regimentation can be accordingly difficult. Basically one can
only prevent the violation of such a norm if it is possible to force the agent to perform the
desired action. However, with people as well as any other autonomous agents this is not
possible because their decisions for actions are precisely taken autonomously (except maybe
for some extreme cases). So, most commonly the implementation of such a norm is done
by giving an incentive to perform the action or a deterrent to avoid the action. E.g., when
you buy a product you must pay for it. Why would a person pay? Because if you pay I will
send you the product (there is a reward/incentive that you want to achieve—because it helps
achieving the goal of possessing the product, which was the purpose of buying it in the first
place). Or if you don’t pay you will never get a product from me anymore.
So, the implementation of this norm actually is given by specifying what are the con-
sequences of performing or avoiding the wanted action where the consequences are things
that are typically under control of the other individuals or the environment. Thus, because
we cannot connect norms directly to the internal mechanisms of an individual, they have to
do with the physical reality by indicating what are the physical or observable consequences
of individuals’ behavior. However, this indirect way of influencing the behavior might not be
successful. The individual still makes her own decision based on her internal motivations and
the relation she wants to maintain with society. Thus if she decides that the consequences of
not performing an action are less important than performing another action she will violate
the norm. This leads us to a more general question on how norms influence individuals.
As said before, norms are part of social reality. As such, norms will use elements of social
reality and their representations in physical reality to influence individuals. On the other
1 This is always possible when one could create a physical reality that allows only for simple interactions:
in this way, norms are not in fact needed because they can be implemented as physical constraints; this
is discussed further in Section 3.2.
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hand norms connect individuals to this social reality. So, how this relation works depends on
how social reality connects with the attitudes of the individual. This is the research area
of social psychology. Unfortunately this research is for a large part descriptive in nature or
describes mechanisms for very limited, detailed phenomena. There are no grand unifying
theories that could be used as basis for our assumptions on how norms would fit into this
framework. Therefore we will limit ourselves to some intuitive (albeit perhaps faulty) remarks
about how a plausible relation might look.
First of all we have to assume that individuals are basically social entities and thus
social reality does influence in some way private attitudes and behavior. Although this
seems obvious for people it is less so for agents. The BDI (Belief-Desire-Intention) models of
agents do not intrinsically contain social attitudes. We claim that values are an essential
element to connect private and social attitudes. Values play an important role in social
reality and, e.g., determine part of the culture of society. Values can also be seen as private
high level standards against which the relative importance of different attitudes is measured.
Introducing values right away leads to a type of norm that is recognized in human society
as moral norms. A moral norm is some regulation of interactions that, when it is followed,
leads to behaviors that promote some shared values. The punishment following from the
violation of the norm moves from the fact that the value is demoted: if we consider that the
behavior of an individual is motivated ultimately by these shared values as well, a violation
of the norm would also mean going against her own values. This right away shows that if
the individual does not share (all) the values this might not be the case. Also there can be
situations where two values would motivate contradictory behaviors. In that case a choice
has to be made depending on the most important value and the consequences of the actions.
For example, do you go into a burning house to safe a victim or stay out to safe your own
life?
One could argue that moral norms are a special kind of social norms, which use the
relation between the individual and social reality to influence its behavior. Intuitively social
norms do not have explicit sanctions or rewards associated with them. The sanctions on
violating a social norm come from a change of the relation between the individual and social
reality. This can, e.g., be lowering of status in a group of friends after failing to help one of
them. The effectiveness of these norms depends heavily on the importance of the affected
social reality for the individual.
Depending on which concepts are available to describe social reality elements one can
distinguish many more norm types. Each of these also only makes sense if the individual also
has corresponding concepts available to take changes in its relation towards those elements
into account. For example, group norms are norms pertaining to the members of a group,
but also defining that group. Fulfilling the group norms is taken as a signal of belonging to
the group and violating them is seen as detaching yourself from the group (unless you are
the leader or contender and want to show your leadership in violating a norm). These norms
only can influence an individual’s behavior if group membership is a motivation for behavior
(and not just a factual belief) of the agent. In a similar vein one can use the fact that most
individuals are fulfilling a norm as a motivating factor to also fulfil the norm. This only
works if being similar to other individuals (in a certain context) can be seen as motivation
for an individual.
The above remarks show that the number of types of norm depend essentially on the
richness of the social reality concepts available and whether the individual has motivational
attitudes using its relation to those aspects of social reality. The more concepts that are
available the more types of norms can be distinguished and the more complex the mechanism
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can be made for them to regulate interactions. On the other hand if no assumptions can be
made about the individual’s attitudes or decision mechanism we have to fall back on the
most simple type of norms: the regimented norms. These norms use concepts directly related
to physical reality and thus can be used as practical constraints on behavior. However, it is
usually impossible (as said above) to implement all norms in this way. Most often this is
remedied by constructing rigid interaction patterns where control resides always outside the
individuals and unwanted behavior can be blocked, while desired actions can be forced or an
alternative can be forced.
3 Requirements and Definitions for Normative MAS
Any attempt to offer a general picture of the role of norms in MAS should preliminarily
assume a robust theory explaining what normativity means. Any theory serving this purpose
can be fruitfully taken from social sciences, where the role of norms is typically explained in
regard to real human societies. The previous section presented some general remarks in that
preliminary perspective.
Indeed, a general picture can be given, as the concepts of “norm” and “normative system”
have been investigated in many distinct disciplines, such as philosophy, sociology, law, and
ethics. However, looking at the literature of these disciplines, even at a first glance it has to be
noticed that these two terms as well as related terms such as “policies”, “laws”, “regulations”,
“convention”, “values”, “morals” will show vast differences when it comes to their definition
and distinction from one another. This is even the case when looking at smaller research
fields such as nMAS, where authors have used a multitude of ways to define these concepts,
differentiate different types of norms, policies, laws, etc. as well as to model them. This lack
of consensus reduces the scientific rigor of communication, modeling, and clarity of thought
when it comes to discussing nMAS. That is why we start this chapter by given a brief outline
of the above mentioned concepts and try to approach a definition by characteristics as well
as some guidelines to distinguish them. We start by focusing on norms in particular as
they are a cornerstone of nMAS, and by defining them also give distinctions for the other
concepts mentioned above. As the large number of existing definitions of the concept of
norms indicates, there is not “the one definition” which defines a standard way of thinking
about norms. This is not surprising as norms are important in many disciplines and the
term is also widely (but loosely) used by humans in everyday life. This makes a complete
consensus not only hard but impossible and that is why we do not aim at a single definition
[54]. Instead we believe that consensus is achievable by defining norms (as well as their
relating terms) with the basic concepts pertained to them and by looking how these concepts
are understood and picked up in the different research disciplines.
Perhaps, a minimal starting point for characterizing norms in MAS should the following
points into account:
Rule structure of norms. It is widely acknowledged that norms have usually a conditional
structure that captures the applicability conditions of the norm and its effects when it is
triggered2. This very general view highlights an immediate link between the concepts of
norm and rule.
2 Norms can be also unconditioned, that is their effects may not depend upon any antecedent condition.
Consider, for example, the norm “everyone has the right to express his or her opinion”. Unconditioned
norms can formally be reconstructed in terms of conditionals with no antecedent conditions.
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Types of norm. There are many types of norms. The common sense meaning of norm refers
to them having a regulatory and mainly prescriptive character. But norms express not
only regulations about how to act. For example, von Wright [97] classified norms into
the following main types (among others):
1. determinative rules, which define concepts or constitute activities that cannot exist
without such rules. These rules are also called in the literature ‘constitutive rules’;
2. technical rules, which state that something has to be done in order for something else
to be attained;
3. prescriptions, which regulate actions by making them obligatory, permitted, or prohib-
ited. These norms, to be complete, should indicate
who (norm-subjects)
does what (the action theme)
in what circumstances (conditions of application), and
the nature of their guidance (the mood).
Basic features of normative systems. Herbert Hart, among other philosophers, clarified for
the law under what conditions normative systems exist [49]. However, Hart’s remarks
can be somewhat generalized and can help us identify some very basic features of almost
any other normative domain:
norm recognition and hierarchies: it is possible to state or identify criteria for normative
systems to establish whether norms belong to them; also, normative systems can assign
to their norms a different ranking status and organize them in hierarchies;
norm application: it is possible to state or identify criteria for normative systems to
correctly apply their norms to concrete cases;
norm change: it is possible to state or identify criteria for changing normative systems.
However, these questions, rather than solving the fundamental definitional problems
regarding the nature of nMAS, open new questions and research perspectives. Following
earlier discussions resulting from previous NorMAS meetings [20, 23, 18, 19], we can formulate
three definitions of norms and nMAS, which we discuss in the remainder of this section.
3.1 The Social Definition
In the social sciences norms are often seen as customary rules of behaviour that coordinate
the interactions in groups and societies [11]. Many norms are enacted in following simple
behavioural rules, like not to bump into other people on the street. Other norms are more
complex, triggering sanctions against individuals departing from such rules. The former are
sometimes called conventions and the latter norms.
The widely shared view across the social sciences and, in fact, also law and philosophy, is
that norms are exogenous variables constraining individual behaviour. The most obvious
form of enforcing norms is by threat of social disapproval or punishment in the event of
norm violation. Less obviously, norms can also be internalised by socialising individuals to
them. In particular, sociology and pedagogy have studied the socialisation of individuals into
society, for instance in the educational system. Norms can also arise from purely voluntary
coordination of interaction. Economics in particular has studied the function of norms in
providing efficient market outcomes. The justification for this kind of research is that “norms
coordinate expectations which reduce transaction costs in interactions that possess multiple
equilibria” [98]. If a norm supports the rise of a focal solution to a coordination problem it
can be considered a form of social capital.
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Against this background, in the social sciences norms typically are viewed as means to
define these relationships, and portraying as well as regulating the behaviour of the members
of a group or society as well as the society as a whole [71].
Research on norms in the social sciences tends to focus on the social function of norms
(see the ideas in [69] for example), the social impact of norms (e.g. [74]), or mechanisms
leading to the emergence and creation of norms (e.g. [33]).
With regard to the aspect of the social function, norms are often concerned with the
behaviour that members of a social group should (or should not) perform regardless of the
possible consequences (also referred to as obligations). Furthermore they deal with the
expectations resulting from the anticipation of the other actors in the system with regard to
this behaviour.
This idea is formalized by Tuomela and Bonnevier-Tuomela [94], for example, who specify
a social norm as a norm having the following form: “An [individual] of the kind F in group
G ought to perform task T in situation C”3 and thereby highlight the four major aspects of
norms in social science: (i) that individuals can be different in their behaviour and might
perform different roles in a society (i.e., F ), (ii) the importance of the relationship of the
individual to a group or society (i.e., G), (iii) the obligation to perform (and indirectly
not to perform) certain tasks (i.e., T ) as a result of a norm, as well as (iv) the notion of
context-dependency (i.e., C) of norms, i.e., that norms might only be valid in particular
situations.
Another important aspect Tuomela and Bonnevier-Tuomela [94] stress is the distinction
between so-called “r-norms” and “s-norms”. The former are norms that are “created by an
authority or body of agents authorized to represent the group (this body can also be the
entire group)” [94]. This authority might, for example, be a governing or legislative body,
the operator of a platform, or a chosen leader. S-norms are norms emerging as a feature of
a (social) normative context, i.e., the result of mutual beliefs about the way a particular
situation should be handled, general codes of conduct or conventions. Thus, in contrast to
r-norms, the concept of s-norm is not based on rules defined by any authority, but tends to
highlight the social aspect of norms. The inclusion of s-norms in this distinction is a rather
important feature of the social sciences. Based on the idea of an s-norm, in addition to the
notion of norms being guidance on what actors are ought or expected to do, in the social
sciences norms are also viewed as an information source of what is perceived to be “normal”
in a group or population [93]. In the social sciences, this “normal” behaviour is explained as
emerging as a general pattern of behaviour by the agents of a MAS making choices without
any centralized planning [1].
With regard to research on the social impact of norms, the focus is placed on the utility
provided to or taken away from the actors involved in an interaction. Utility is defined here
as the relative (both positive and negative) satisfaction achieved by the actors. This utility
can be either internal, such as emotion levels and energy, or external, in the case of money,
etc. Social impact research analyses the effect of utilities of the different stakeholders in a
society resulting from specific norms as well as on the society as a whole [73].
Besides these works on the social function, the social impact as well as the emergence
and creation of norms, in the social sciences (in particular in philosophy) further important
scientific contributions have been made dealing with normative positions [90]. The two
normative positions we have talked about in this chapter so far are permissions and obligations.
3 Despite the strong emphasis of this statement on obligations, i.e., what one ought to do, [94] in the
course of their definition broadens it to include permission (i.e, what one may do) as well.
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Although these describe norms to a large extent, within the world of legal theory several
more positions can be found, including power, duty, right, liability, disability, claim and
immunity for example [51]. The position of power is of particular interest as a restraint on
the (physical) power of agents. In social science, power can have two different forms, which
are both described by [67]: (i) legal power, and (ii) physical power.
Whereas the former specifies whether an actor is “empowered” to perform a certain action
in a legal sense, the latter establishes whether he is physically able to carry out the actions
necessary to exercise his legal power [55]. Whereas this distinction between physical and
normative power is relatively easy to make, it is important not to confuse normative power
and the term “permissions” explained earlier as well as to understand how the different
concepts are linked in a system and to define when which agent has which power or permission
well.
I Problem 1. How to define the relation between physical and legal power as well as permission
in a system and how to define at which point of time or in which state an agent has which
powers (both physical and legal) as well as permissions?
To explain the difference between normative power and permission [67, p. 409] gives an
illustrative example:
[. . . ] consider the case of a priest of a certain religion who does not have the permission,
according to instructions issued by the ecclesiastical authorities, to marry two people,
only one of whom is of that religion, unless they both promise to bring up the children
in that religion. He may [in his function as priest] nevertheless have the power to
marry the couple even in the absence of such a promise, in the sense that if he goes
ahead and performs the ceremony, it still counts as a valid act of marriage under the
rules of the same church even though the priest may be subject to reprimand or more
severe penalty for having performed it.
What is important to note besides this difference between permission and legal power, is
the difference in legal and physical power. Thus, despite the priest having the legal power,
physical power does not follow automatically. Thus, the priest might be incapacitated by
being sick for example, and as a consequence is physically not able to perform the normative
action of marrying two people, despite having the legal power to do so. In the opposite
direction the two notions of power also do not have a coercive relation: having the practical
possibility and power to act does not necessarily imply that a legal power is also existing. To
give an example, someone might not have the legal power to conduct a marriage, despite
being physically able to do so (e.g., by not being physically incapacitated and knowing the
procedure, etc.).
As a result of this view on norms in the social sciences, some common features can
be found, such as the idea that norms are rules that define what is considered right or
wrong by the majority of a population. The definition of the majority of the population
and the particular features of the population (i.e., its size or composition) therefore are
domain dependent [52]. Norms furthermore spread; that implies that they are acquired and
communicated through means that can be direct (e.g., communication between the actors in
a system) or indirect (such as adaption and learning processes by the actors).
Taking these common basic concepts pertaining to norms, a first social science inspired
definition of nMAS could be made as follows:
I Definition 1 (nMAS – The Social Definition). A normative multi-agent system is a MAS
governed by restrictions on patterns of behaviour of the agents in the system that are
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actively or passively transmitted and have a social function and impact. These patterns
are sometimes represented as actions to be performed [4]. In principle they dictate what
actions (or outcomes) are permitted, empowered, prohibited or obligatory under a given set
of conditions as well as specify effects of complying or not complying with the norms [6].
They can emerge within the nMAS or can be created a priori by the nMAS designer. Norms
should be contextual, prescriptive and followable [87].
The notion of contextuality refers to norms only being applicable in a specific context
and not in general. To give an example: despite being generally valid, rules for driving a car
are only applicable in traffic settings and these traffic settings provide the context for the
application of the respective norms. This notion of contextuality also sets a scope to the
time a norm is in force and consequently requires the definition of the activation, as well as
existence and deactivation of a norm.
I Problem 2. How to specify the context(s) in which norms apply and do not apply and how
to ensure that agents can determine which context they are acting in?
That norms should be prescriptive refers to the fact that “those who are knowledgeable
of a rule also know that they can be held accountable if they break it” [87, p. 41]. Thus, norms
specify what actions an actor “must not” perform (prohibition), “is empowered to perform”
(legal power), “must perform” (obligation) or may perform (“permission”) if the actors want
to avoid sanctions for non-compliance with the norms being imposed on them. What is
important to note is that the prescriptive criterion (i.e. that agents knowledgeable of norms
should know that they can be held accountable for breaking them) does not necessarily imply
the opposite to be true, i.e., that one can only be held accountable if one knew about a norm.
However it poses the problem that as a system designer one might want to account for this
difference.
I Problem 3. How to deal with a lack of normative awareness and if it is being considered,
how to check the lack of normative awareness if an agent’s knowledge base is not accessible?
Finally, rules should be followable in the sense that it should be physically possible for the
actors in a system to both perform and not to perform prohibited, obligatory or permitted
actions, as well as to obtain the legal power to do so [5]. This poses another problem:
I Problem 4. How to ensure that norms are followable for agents at any state/point of time,
or phrased differently, how to ensure that two (sets of) norms do not conflict with one another
(e.g. by allowing and not allowing an action at the same time) [61]?
In addition to this social science inspired definition, the NorMAS community has discussed
definitions emphasising further features of MAS in previous NorMAS meetings. These
definitions are the focus of the next two sections.
3.2 The Norm-change Definition
The norm-change definition runs as follows:
I Definition 2 (nMAS – The Norm-change Definition [20]). “A normative multi-agent system
is a multi-agent system together with normative systems in which agents on the one hand can
decide whether to follow the explicitly represented norms, and on the other the normative
systems specify how and to what extent the agents can modify the norms.”
Hence, under this view norm dynamics plays a crucial role, which opens a number
of related questions. In [18, 19] three guidelines for developing nMAS were derived from
Definition 2.
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I Guideline 1. Motivate which definition of nMAS is used and so explain which of the
following choices should be adopted:
1. norms must be explicitly represented in agents and in the system in a declarative way
(the ‘strong’ interpretation), or
2. norms must be explicitly represented in the overall system specification (the ‘weak’
interpretation), or
3. none of the above interpretations should be adopted.
It was argued in [18, 19] that the strong interpretation must be preferred whenever we
want to prevent a too generic notion of norm. In fact, we should avoid trivializing this notion,
which is a risk when we see any specification requirement as a norm that the system has to
comply with. However, the weak interpretation is sometimes more suitable to address the
following problems:
I Problem 5 (Norm compliance). How we can check whether a system complies with relevant
norms applicable to it?
I Problem 6 (Norm implementation). How can we design a system such that it complies with
a given set of norms?
Problems 5 and 6 amount to studying the concept of compliance at runtime and by design,
so they can be meaningful also when we adopt for nMAS the strong reading. Notice that
both problems require, in general, the articulation of the conditions under which the relevant
norms are part of the normative system at hand and can correctly be triggered and applied:
these issues correspond, as we said, to the first two basic features of any normative domain.
Finally, notice that any attempt to address Definition 2 and Guideline 1 also requires
the preliminary clarification of the types of norm we need to embed within nMAS. This
clarification is very relevant, since different types of norms sometimes correspond to different
formal (and logical) models and so distinct options may differently affect the choice between
the strong and weak interpretations for the explicit representation of norms within nMAS.
We have already mentioned von Wright’s norm classification. In [38] an extensive analysis of
requirements for representing norms has been proposed for the law. Consider the following
aspects, which contribute to classifying norms and which can be extended to other normative
domains besides the law4:
Temporal properties [42]. Norms can be qualified by temporal properties, such as:
1. the time when the norm is in force;
2. the time when the norm can produce effects; and
3. the time when the normative effects hold.
Normative effects. There are many normative effects that follow from applying norms, such
as obligations, permissions, prohibitions and also more articulated effects such as those
introduced for the law, for example, by Hohfeld (see [86]). Below is a rather comprehensive
classification of normative effects [84]:
Evaluative, which indicate that something is good or bad, is a value to be optimised
or an evil to be minimised. Consider, for example, “Human dignity is valuable”,
“Participation ought to be promoted”;
4 Gordon et al. [38] also study whether existing rule interchange languages for the legal domain are
expressive enough to fully model all the features listed below (and those recalled below, Section 3.3):
RuleML, SBVR, SWRL, RIF, and LKIF.
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Qualificatory, which ascribe a normative quality to a person or an object. Consider, for
example, “x is a citizen”;
Definitional, which specify the meaning of a term. Consider, for example, “Tolling
agreement means any agreement to put a specified amount of raw material per period
through a particular processing facility”;
Deontic, which, typically, impose the obligation or confer the permission to do a certain
action. For example, “x has the obligation to do A”;
Potestative, which attribute powers. For example, “A worker has the power to terminate
his work contract”;
Evidentiary, which establish the conclusion to be drawn from certain evidence. Consider,
for example, when the sentence “It is presumed that dismissal was discriminatory” is
concluded from some piece of evidence;
Existential, which indicate the beginning or the termination of the existence of a norm-
ative entity. For example, “The company ceases to exist”;
Norm-concerning effects, which state the modifications of norms; for the law: abroga-
tion, repeal, substitution, and so on.
Definition 2 raises two other fundamental research questions, which concern, respectively,
whether agents in nMAS can violate norms and how and why norms can be changed in
nMAS.
Hence, the second guideline follows from the fact that agents, insofar as they are supposed
to be autonomous, can decide whether to follow the norms. Indeed, it would be misleading
for the specification of a nMAS to disregard “the distinction between normative behavior (as
it should be) and actual behavior (as it is)” [70, preface]. Avoiding making this distinction is
misleading for three reasons: if any “illegal behavior is just ruled out by specification” then
we are unable to “specify what should happen if such illegal but possible behaviors occurs!”
[70, preface];
we fail to adopt a meaningful concept of norm, since philosophers and deontic logicians
mostly agree that genuine norms (and their effects) can be violated (as an extreme
example, it does not make any sense to say that A ∧ ¬A is forbidden); and
agents cannot violate norms and so we do not model one important aspect of agents’
autonomy in normative agent architectures and decision making [29].
Accordingly, a theoretically sound definition of nMAS would assume that agents can
violate norms, so if a norm is a kind of constraint, the question immediately is raised what is
special about them. While hard constraints are restricted to preventative control systems in
which violations are impossible, soft constraints are used in detective control systems where
violations can be detected. This justifies the following guideline:
I Guideline 2. Make explicit why your norms are a kind of (soft) constraint that deserve
special analysis.
A typical illustration of how normative soft constraints work is the situation in which
one can enter a train without a ticket, but may be checked and sanctioned. In contrast, a
supposed illustration of a hard-constraint implementation of a norm is the situation in which
one cannot enter a metro station without a ticket [18, 19]. However, a closer inspection of
the metro example shows that, strictly speaking, this does not correspond to a genuine case
where violations are made impossible, but only where they are normally and in most cases
prevented to occur: indeed, one could, for instance, break the metro barriers and travel
without any ticket. When violations are impossible in any conceivable way, the concept of
norm does not make much sense.
Chapte r 01
12 Norms in MAS: Definitions and Related Concepts
On the other hand, if the norms are represented as soft constraints, then the problem is
to check if the process of monitoring violations is correctly managed, since this detective
control is the result of actions of agents and therefore subject to errors and influenceable by
actions of other agents. For example, it may be the case that violations are not detected
often enough, there are conflicting obligations in the normative system, that agents are able
to block the sanction or update the normative system, etc.
More information on compliance and norm violation is given in Chapter 5.
The third guideline follows from the fact that norms can be changed by the agents or by
the system. Suppose, for example, that a nMAS must be checked against some legal system.
As is well-known, one of the peculiar features of the law is that it necessarily takes the form
of a dynamic normative system [56]. Hence, the life-cycle of agents must be described with
respect to a changing set of norms. Similar considerations can be applied to many other
normative domains, as we argued that it is possible to state or identify criteria for changing
many types of normative system:
I Guideline 3 (Norm change). Explain why and how norms can be changed at runtime.
In general, in nMAS a norm can be made by an agent, as legislators do in a legal system,
or there can be an algorithm that observes agent behavior, and suggests a norm when it
observes a pattern. The agents can vote on the acceptance of the norm [62]. Likewise, if the
system observes that a norm is often violated, then apparently the norm does not work as
desired, and it undermines the trust of the agents in the normative system, so the system
can suggest that the agents can vote whether to retract or change the norm.
More on norm change can be found in Chapter 2 and 6.
3.3 The Mechanism Design Definition
The mechanism design definition of nMAS runs as follows:
I Definition 3 (nMAS – The Mechanism Design Definition [23]). “A normative multi-agent
system is a multi-agent system organized by means of mechanisms to represent, communicate,
distribute, detect, create, modify, and enforce norms, and mechanisms to deliberate about
norms and detect norm violation and fulfilment.”
Norms are rules used to guide, control, or regulate desired system behavior. An nMAS
system is a self-organizing system, and norms can be violated. Boella et al. [18, 19] derive
two guidelines from this definition, which focus on the role of norms, either as a mechanism
or as part of a larger institution or organization.
I Guideline 4. Discuss the use and role of norms always as a mechanism in a game-theoretic
setting.
I Guideline 5. Clarify the role of norms in your system as part of an organization or
institution.
Both these guidelines lead to handling more specific research problems:
I Problem 7 (Norms and games). A relevant problem has to do with investigating the
connection between games and norms. In fact, games can explain that norms should satisfy
various properties and also the role of various kinds of norms in a system. For example,
Bulygin [25] explains why permissive norms are needed in normative systems using his “Rex,
Minister and Subject” game. Boella and van der Torre introduce a game theoretic approach
to normative systems [22] to study violation games, institutionalized games, negotiation
games, norm creation games, and control games. Norms should satisfy various properties to
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be effective as a mechanism to obtain desirable behavior. For example, the system should
not sanction without reason, and sanctions should not be too mild or too harsh.
I Problem 8 (Norms and their functions). Another research problem consists of providing a
clarification of the different role that norms can play in agents’ societies. As we mentioned
in the previous section, norms may have a number of different effects, and so they do not
only impose duties and establish sanctions for their violation. Hence, in a game-theoretic
perspective they not only have a preventive character, but, for instance, also provide incentives.
However, moral incentives are very different from financial or legal incentives. For example,
the number of violations may increase when financial sanctions are imposed, because the
moral incentive to comply with the norm is destroyed [59, 35, p. 18–20]. Moreover, norms
and trust have been discussed to analyze backward induction (which is an iterative process
in game theory for solving finite extensive form or sequential games) [53].
I Problem 9 (Norms and organizational design). How do norms contribute to design agents’
organizations? Norms are addressed to roles played by agents [21] and used to model
organizations as first class citizens in multi-agent systems. In particular, constitutive norms
are used to assign powers to agents playing roles inside the organization. Such powers allow
the issuing of commands to other agents, making formal communications and restructuring
the organization itself, for example, by managing the assignment of agents to roles. Moreover,
normative systems also allow modeling the structure of an organization and not only the
interdependencies among the agents of an organization. Legal institutions are defined by
Ruiter [85] as “systems of [regulative and constitutive] rules that provide frameworks for social
action within larger rule-governed settings”. They are “relatively independent institutional
legal orders within the comprehensive legal orders”.
Hence, Definition 3, Guideline 4 and 5 and the related research problems require, too,
additional clarification on the types of norm we need to model for nMAS. Also in this second
perspective, many of Gordon et al.’s requirements [38] for specifically representing norms in
the law are directly applicable to modeling roles, organizations and institutions. Important
requirements for legal rule languages from the field of AI and Law include the following:
Isomorphism [8]. To ease validation and maintenance, there should be a one-to-one corres-
pondence between the rules in the formal model and the units of natural language text
which express the rules in the original normative sources, such as sections of legislation.
This entails, for example, that a general rule and separately stated exceptions, in different
sections of a statute, should not be converged into a single rule in the formal model.
Rule semantics. Any language for modeling norms should be based on a precise and rigorous
semantics, which allows for correctly computing the effects that should follow from a set
of norms.
Defeasibility [37, 79, 86]. When the antecedent of a norm is satisfied by the facts of a case,
the conclusion of the rule presumably holds, but is not necessarily true. The defeasibility
of norms breaks down in the law into the following issues:
Conflicts [79]. Rules can conflict, namely, they may lead to incompatible legal effects.
Conceptually, conflicts can be of different types, according to whether two conflicting
rules
are such that one is an exception of the other (i.e., one is more specific than the
other);
have a different ranking status; or
have been enacted at different times;
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Accordingly, rule conflicts can be resolved using principles about rule priorities, such
as:
lex specialis, which gives priority to the more specific rules (the exceptions);
lex superior, which gives priority to the rule from the higher authority (see ‘Authority’
above); and
lex posterior, which gives priority to the rule enacted later (see ‘Temporal parameters’
above).
Exclusionary norms [79, 86, 37]. Some norms provide one way to explicitly undercut
other rules, namely, to make them inapplicable.
Contributory reasons or factors [86]. It is not always possible to formulate precise rules,
even defeasible ones, for aggregating the factors relevant for resolving a normative
issue. Consider, for example, “The educational value of a work needs to be taken into
consideration when evaluating whether the work is covered by the copyright doctrine of
fair use.”
Norm validity [42]. Norms can be invalid or become invalid. Deleting invalid norms is not
an option when it is necessary to reason retroactively with norms which were valid at
various times over a course of events. For instance, in the law:
1. The annulment of a norm is usually seen as a kind of repeal which invalidates the
norm and removes it from the legal system as if it had never been enacted. The effect
of an annulment applies ex tunc: annulled norms are prevented from producing any
legal effects, also for past events.
2. An abrogation on the other hand operates ex nunc: The norm continues to apply for
events which occurred before the rule was abrogated.
Legal procedures. Norms not only regulate the procedures for resolving normative conflicts
(see above), but also for arguing or reasoning about whether or not some action or state
complies with other norms [40]. In particular, norms are required for procedures which
1. regulate how to detect violations of the law (for the law is not sufficient that a violation
is detected, but how this happens: illegal detection may lead to void effects); or
2. determine the normative effects triggered by norm violations, such as reparative
obligations, which are meant to repair or compensate violations (the law distinguishes
different types of sanction that can be applied to the same wrongdoings).
Persistence of normative effects [43]. Some normative effects persist over time unless some
other and subsequent event terminates them. For example: “If one causes damage, one
has to provide compensation”. Other effects hold on the condition and only while the
antecedent conditions of the rules hold. For example: “If one is in a public building, one
is forbidden to smoke”.
Values [7]. Usually, norms promote some underlying values or goals. Modeling norms
sometimes needs to support the representation of these values and value preferences,
which can play also the role of meta-criteria for solving norm conflicts. (Given two
conflicting norms r1 and r2, value v1, promoted by r1, is preferred to value v2, promoted
by r2, and so r1 overrides r2.)
Some of these requirements, as they are formulated above (they are recalled from [38]), are
peculiar of the legal domain only or, at least, of any “codified” system of norms (consider,
e.g., the “Isomorphism” requirement). However, almost all can be easily adjusted to fit many
other normative domains. Besides some very general requirements, such as “Defeasibility”
and “Rule semantics”—which correspond to aspects widely acknowledged for most normative
domains—the other requirements are also important for nMAS. Consider, for instance, the
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problem of the temporal persistence of norm effects, the fact that norms can be valid only
under some conditions, or the role of exclusionary reasons.
4 Norms, Policies, Laws and Conventions
We previously noted that currently a multitude of views on the definition of the terms
“norm” and “nMAS” exists. In that perspective, we highlighted some of these definitions
by identifying generally established characteristics of norms and gave some guidelines on
how to distinguish norms from other concepts. This section now has a closer look at related
terms such as “policies”, “laws” and “conventions” and points out differences as well as
similarities with norms. In detail, this section recalls the definitions on norms given earlier
(especially in Section 3.1) and gives a short overview of the meaning of the term “policy” in
the research domains from which they have been borrowed, namely social science, political
science, economics and law. Afterwards we relate the gained information to the concepts of
“laws” and “conventions”.
As pointed out in Section 3.1, in the social sciences norms are often seen as customary
rules of behaviour that coordinate the interactions in groups and societies [11] as well as give
advice on how individuals should behave. Norms therefore often have some social goal, such
as the reduction of transaction costs in coordination and collaboration situations.
Not all norms are, however, geared towards efficiency and even if norms may fulfill
important social functions they cannot be explained solely on the basis of this function. In
fact, even if a means-end relationship between a norm and a social goal exists, this may not
be the reason the norm came to be [30, p. 322]. In addition, many norms may persist even if
they are inefficient or contested. In particular philosophy of law has studied how new norms
can be justified [45, p. 631]. This is relevant because in post-traditional societies legislation
has become a key feature of the integration of society and the procedures bringing about new
laws themselves represent institutionalised norms. This has received attention from different
disciplines because institutionalising norms departs from seeing norms purely as interactions
of individuals. Legal science, and to a certain extent also political science, considers norms
to be hierarchically differentiated and policies are part of this hierarchy.
In social science, policies are understood as instruments to implement norms [95], and
are used by policy makers to encourage society to adopt certain norms5. The constitution of
the state embodies basic legal norms and these constrain politics and policies. On the other
hand policies also represent emerging social norms, which may over time come to transform
the governing body. According to Lowi’s dictum that policies determine politics [64] political
actors seek to implement new norms through policies, eventually changing politics too. In
doing so they draw on formal (e.g., the law) and informal (e.g., social norms) institutions.
Over time even the hard-wired norms of the governing body may be changed despite the
hierarchical relationship between governing body and policies. Thus, existing legal norms
and new social norms emerging in the political process can be said to form a recursive cycle.
From the above statements one can also infer information about the differences between
laws and conventions with respect to norms. Laws are typically forming a system of rules
and guidelines which are enforced through a judicial system to govern behavior, wherever
possible. What is important about laws is that they are made by some authority of the
5 Policies are not the only way norms can be implemented, but they can also emerge as generally accepted
social behaviour. Thus, policies only cover a certain part of norms and are generally understood to be
preceded by them.
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system (e.g., a government) and are explicitly written down and made publicly available.
In contrast to laws, conventions are a set of agreed, stipulated or generally accepted
standards, social norms or criteria, often taking the form of a custom, which are not necessarily
written down, but are often transmitted through other (informal) means. Although a (social)
convention is a regularity widely observed by some group of agents, the reverse—that every
regularity is a convention—is not always true. To give an example of this, we all eat, sleep,
and breathe, yet these are not conventions [81].
In contrast, the fact that everyone in the UK drives on the left-hand side of the road
rather than the right is a convention [60], which started from an information behaviour and
was made formal by means of laws later on [66]. With respect to norms, conventions are
often seen as simpler rules, with limited or no sanctioning attached to them, whereas norms
tend to be more complex and often have some form of enforcement idea attached to them.
5 Specific Developments, Open Questions and Trades with Other
Disciplines
In the previous sections we mentioned several research issues and general aspects of norm-
ativity in MAS. We will recall in the remainder some of them by suggesting research lines
for nMAS that, though important, have not yet received sufficient attention in the MAS
community:
The concept of moral agency, especially in a cognitive perspective;
The concept of group norm;
The connection between argumentation and norms;
Conceptual vagueness and fuzziness of legal norms.
For each of them we will indicate some open problems and research perspectives. We will
finally identify possible links among them in terms of what benefits each research line can
offer to the others.
5.1 Moral Agency and the Mental Side of Normativity
Although the concepts of morality and moral agency have been extensively studied in social
philosophy and in the social sciences, they have been so far less studied in the areas of
multi-agent systems and normative multi-agent systems. Some works have been proposed on
the extension of the BDI (Belief, Desire, Intention) model with normative concepts such as
the concept of obligation [24, 41], but none of them have really focused on the integration of
moral aspects into the architecture of a cognitive agent.
Developing formal models of cognitive agents integrating a moral dimension is a promising
research avenue for these two areas. Indeed, as shown by social scientists [34, 32], decisions
of human agents are often affected by moral sentiments and moral concerns (e.g. concerns for
fairness or equity). Therefore, to take the presence of moral attitudes into account becomes
extremely important when developing formal and computational models of artificial agents
which are expected to interact with human agents (e.g., trading agents, recommender systems,
and tutoring agents).
A model of moral agency should be able to explain the two different origins of an agent’s
motivations. Some of them originate from the agents’ desires. A desire can be conceived as
an agent’s attitude which consists of an anticipatory mental representation of a pleasant state
of affairs (the representational dimension of a desire) that motivates the agent to achieve
it (the motivational dimension of a desire). In this perspective, the motivational dimension
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of an agent’s desire is realized through its representational dimension. For example when
an agent desires to be at the Japanese restaurant eating sushi, he imagines himself eating
sushi at the Japanese restaurant and this representation gives him pleasure. This pleasant
representation motivates him to go to the Japanese restaurant in order to eat sushi.
Agents are motivated not only by their desires but also by their moral values. Moral
values, and more generally moral attitudes (ideals, standards, etc.), originate from an agent’s
capability of discerning what from his point of view is (morally) good from what is (morally)
bad. If an agent has a certain ideal ϕ, then he thinks that the realization of the state of
affairs ϕ ought to be promoted because ϕ is good in itself.6
Morality is a composite cognitive phenomenon. Aspects of this phenomenon that deserve
to be studied and to be implemented in the computational architecture of a cognitive agent
are, for example:
the concept of moral choice, i.e., how the utility of a given decision option for an agent is
determined by both the agent’s desires and the agent’s moral values [48]; and
moral emotions such as guilt, moral pride and reproach [46].
5.2 Group Norms
Group norms address groups of individuals, affecting their joint behaviours, which arises
in many situations; consider, e.g., an obligation on the sales team to meet once a week,
a prohibition on gatherings of more than x people, or a permission for a group visit to a
building. This section makes a case for the importance of representing and processing such
norms, raises issues which should be investigated, and sketches how research on group norms
could connect coordination mechanisms and normative reasoning.
5.2.1 Description of the Topic
Group norms can be seen as those norms addressing collections of individuals and affecting
their joint behaviours. This is a specific interpretation of group norms, as there are other
kinds of regulations aimed at groups of people (as opposed to individuals), but these do not
concern joint behaviours.
For instance, a norm establishing that “non-EU nationals must join queue Q”, although
addressing a group, does not place constraints on individuals’ joint behaviours, that is,
non-EU nationals do not have to agree on how to act collectively. On the other hand, norms
such as “at most 5 people are allowed in room R”, “procedure P can only be carried out by
a team of 3 people” and “gatherings of more than 3 people are forbidden”, all influence the
collective behaviour of those whom the norm addresses. Individuals will need to agree on
what to do and when, in order to abide by norms whilst striving to achieve their goals.
Coordination is essential for agents to adequately process such group norms. Although
there are many ways in which autonomous entities may interact, ranging from a simple
Contract Net protocol [92], to auctions, negotiations and argumentation, the outcome of this
activity is an agreed joint plan of action, listing what each party will do and when. Research
on group norms will ultimately connect coordination mechanisms (and group deliberation),
norm representation and individual (normative) reasoning.
6 A similar distinction has also been made by philosophers. See [89] for a recent philosophical analysis of
how an agent may want something without desiring it and the problem of reasons for acting based on
values and independent from desires.
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5.2.2 Background
Work on collective agency (e.g., [26, 27, 76]) and collective obligations (e.g., [44]) have
addressed similar concerns. These approaches represent norms over actions, also establishing
a group of agents to whom the norms apply. Some approaches regard a group norm as a
shorthand for a norm which applies to all/some members of the group (e.g., [27]), whereas
other approaches (e.g., [44]) regard a group norm (more specifically, a collective obligation)
as a shared complex action requiring individual contributions (i.e., simpler actions) from
those individuals of the group.
Research on joint action and coalitions (e.g., [68, 83, 50]) is also relevant as it looks into
individual deliberation when coordination is required. Work exploring aspects of delegation
(e.g., [72, 63]) sheds light on how norms can be transfered among individuals and groups.
The concept of roles used in work on societies, electronic institutions and organisations,
also provides means to address collections of individuals. We note that norms addressed at
roles are a useful shorthand for specialised norms addressed at individuals, yet the usual
definition of role norms does not aim to influence the joint behaviour of individuals.
A flexible means to specify groups of agents is needed, in order to capture the class of
group norms we have in mind. Moreover, group specifications should be compact, allowing
for an intensional definition of those belonging to the group. For instance, being able to
represent a group with at most 3 workers (from a potentially larger universe of workers)
is useful, as some of the norms we want to capture require flexibility, compactness, and
precision.
5.2.3 Current Understanding
Group norms ultimately influence collective behaviour. Individuals must agree on a joint plan
of action to achieve certain goals or to avoid some situations. In order to do this, individuals
must be aware of i) the norms in place; ii) their membership of groups (and hence whether
any group norms apply to them); iii) how their behaviour conforms or not to any applicable
norms (and whether there are incentives to abide or not by the norms).
Any account of group norms for nMAS needs to devise an expressive, compact and precise
specification language. Such an account also requires developing mechanisms to process these
norms, in order to check their applicability (to individuals), and to endow individuals with
means to factor these norms in when deciding on rational individual behaviours.
Individual choices also involve collective deliberation on joint courses of action. Indeed,
group norms address collections of individuals; hence, even though individual action are
ultimately the ones performed, in groups some interconnected actions can together “count
as” group actions. For instance, when 4 people lift a square table the individual actions are
to lift each of the 4 corners. The choice of which individual action(s) each member of the
group chooses, taking into account any norms in place, is thus very important.
5.2.4 Questions, Challenges & Expected Lines of Research
The concept of group norms has not been adequately investigated. These norms, however,
do exist in reality, and they influence individuals and, ultimately, groups. Phenomena arising
from such group norms and their processing is of great importance to policy makers, and
designers of agents and autonomous systems.
It seems to us that there are two strands for a promising analysis of group norms. On the
one hand, group norms can be defined in suitable operational semantics, which describe the
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meaning of norms as influencing a collective agreement over a joint plan. On the other hand,
we can investigate model-theoretic aspects of group norms as a deontic logic for coalitions.
We notice the potential for strategic reasoning, whereby individuals may form groups so as
to avoid norms or indeed have norms on them. This is the case, for instance, of agents joining
or forming a group because a permission is in place for the group. Likewise, individuals may
avoid being part of a group because some unwanted norm is in place. Strategic formation and
dissolution of groups thus allows agents to behave in a norm-compliant fashion but avoiding
penalties associated with norm violation.
5.3 Argumentation and Norms
Norms and argumentation are two research areas which are becoming more and more
connected over the last decade, in the legal field, in knowledge representation, ethics, or
linguistics, and most recently, in agreement technologies in computer science7. Norms are
used to set the space of legal agreements (or commitments) and argumentation is used to
choose among the possible agreements [12]. Moreover, we may consider that norms set not
only the scope of possible legal agreements, but also the way we can choose among these
possible agreements.
5.3.1 Background
In law, Bench-Capon et al. [9] present how argumentation theory has been used in legal
reasoning. For instance, legal disputes arise out of a disagreement between two parties and
may be resolved by presenting arguments in favor of each party’s position. These arguments
are proposed to a judging entity, who will justify the choice of the arguments he accepts
with an argument of his own, with the aim to convince the public. The common conclusion
shared by such works is that argumentation has the potential to become a useful tool for
people working in the legal field. Even if a common answer from lawyers when they are
asked about what argumentation theory can do for them is that it can be used to deduce
the consequences from a set of facts and legal rules, and to detect possible conflicts, there is
much more to argumentation. Following the example proposed by Bench-Capon et al. [9], a
case is not a mere set of facts, but it can be seen as a story told by a client to his lawyer. The
first thing the lawyer does is to interpret this story in a particular legal context. The lawyer
can interpret the story in several different ways, and each interpretation will require further
facts to be obtained. Then the lawyer has to select one of the possible interpretations, she
has to provide arguments to persuade the judging entity of the client’s position, and to rebut
any further objection. The major topics that emerge as relevant in norms and argumentation
include, among others, case based reasoning [3, 82], arguing about conflicts and defeasibility
in rule based systems [91, 77, 80], dialogues and dialectics [36], argument schemes [39, 10],
and arguing about the successfulness of the attacks [31, 78].
5.3.2 Current Understanding
Existing works (see Section 5.3.1) on norms and argumentation can be categorized into two
different classes, namely (i) arguing about norms, and (ii) norms about argumentation (for a
review of the literature, see [75]). The former includes the greater part of existing works in
7 Agreement technologies refer to computer systems in which autonomous software agents negotiate with
one another in order to come to mutually acceptable agreements.
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the area of norms and argumentation, such as approaches which aim at resolving conflicts
and dilemmas, looking in particular at how norms interact with other norms, arguing about
norm interpretation and dynamics, arguing about norm adoption, acceptance and generation,
representing norm negotiation, and arguing about contracts. In spite of all the existing
literature on these topics, several challenges have still to be addressed and resolved. For
instance, the introduction of frameworks where the individuals can discuss the merits and
the effects of the norms to be adopted in the society, and the proposal of preference models
allowing the detection and reasoning about norm interactions are fundamental steps to
approaching the two research areas. The latter class of research includes a smaller set of
existing works, and it aims at addressing the challenges about dialogue and debate protocols,
reasoning about epistemic norms, and enforcement models of the burden of proof. For
instance, the introduction of new techniques to verify whether a virtual agent complies
with an epistemic norm, and the development of tools able to support judging entities and
lawyers to enforce the burden of proof are further challenges for agreement technologies.
Finally, besides norms about argumentation and arguing about norms, direct formal relations
between deontic logic – in particular input/output logic – and abstract argumentation have
been considered [14, 15, 16], leading to a number of additional challenges.
5.3.3 Questions, Challenges & Expected Lines of Research
Open challenges in this field are connected with the following research topics:
Arguing about norms:
1. societal modelling and control: where individuals debate about the merits of norms
and their effects;
2. societal modelling and control: where individuals persuade others about the utility of
norm adoption;
3. constitutive norms: more than two agents performing ontology alignment;
4. constitutive norms: avoiding the need for the central ontology mapping repository;
5. regulative norms: considering norms in practical reasoning;
6. normative constraints: complex normative reasoning for deadlines, norm violation,
norm fulfillment;
7. normative constraints: using argument schemes to reason about norms being or not in
force;
8. normative conflict: developing reacher preference models and logics for reasoning
about norm interaction;
9. practical reasoning: integration of domain specific knowledge and inference using
argument schemes;
10. practical reasoning: new reasoning heuristics;
11. monitoring norms: identifying argument schemes (in the sense of [39, 10]), which
reason about uncertainty;
12. monitoring norms: weighting up conflicting uncertain evidence.
Norms about argumentation:
1. dialogue: interplay between dialectical norms (those norms that specifically govern
dialogues and the exchange of arguments) and procedural norms (see Section 3.3);
2. dialogue: modelling dialogues where several norms regulate a dialogue;
3. burden of proof : tools for supporting people in the legal field to verify proof standards.
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We claim that these future challenges have to be addressed both from the theoretical and
from the design point of view. We need to define new innovative models using argumentation
theory in legal reasoning or applying norms in the argumentation, and tools that really
implement the proposed models and theories in order to not leave such theories at the pure
abstract level. Consider, for instance, the application of norms to the argumentation process.
Proof standards and burden of proof are key examples of norms applied to argumentation.
While several burden of proof have been theoretically defined in the literature, such as burden
of claiming and burden of questioning, a challenge to be addressed consists in the development
of tools to support the humans operating in the legal field. The idea is to start from systems
like Carneades8, which already provide a tool for modeling legal dialogues, and improve
them to support the interaction with humans. For instance, a judge can use such a tool to
look at the argumentation framework which models the trial, and she will be able to detect
the possible “irregularities” with respect to the burden of proof. Moreover, the tool should
provide the judge with a summary of the argumentation framework representing the trial’s
arguments. A possible way for formalizing such a summary may be to use argumentation
patterns [96], where meaningful sets of arguments together with their attack relations are
identified and treated as a unique piece of information with a precise meaning. The same
tool can be used by lawyers to detect the possible weak points of a deliberation. In this way,
the lawyer will know exactly the weak points to appeal. The development of such a tool
based on burden of proof is a big challenge in norms and argumentation.
5.4 Applying Norms in a Flexible and Adaptive Way: Fuzziness in
Legal Interpretation
Legal interpretation is a mechanism allowing legal norms to be adapted to unforeseen
situations. This section outlines promising research lines in nMAS on the role of interpretation
in legal reasoning. As recalled in Section 3, norms have typically a conditional structure and
may be thus represented as a rule b1, . . . , bn ⇒ l such that l is the legal effect linked to the
norm. The degree associated to l depends on the degrees of truth of conditions for each bi.
These degrees depend in turn on the goal associated with the norm. An interesting approach
is to define the fuzzy set b′i = f(bi, gj) where the value of each b′i increases or decreases
according to the match between bi and the goal associated with the norm j. The degree of
match depends on how concepts relevant to the norm are defined in a domain ontology.
5.4.1 Description of the Topic and Background
5.4.1.1 Legal Interpretation
Since norms have a conditional structure such as b1, . . . , bn ⇒ l (if b1, . . . , bn hold, then l
should be the case), if l states that, e.g., some p is obligatory, then an agent is compliant
with respect to this norm if p is obtained whenever b1, . . . , bn are derived. Many logical
models of legal reasoning assume that conditions of norms give a complete description of
their applicability (for a discussion, see [86]). However, this assumption is too strong, due
to the complexity and dynamics of the world. Norms cannot take into account all the
possible conditions in which they should or should not be applied, giving rise to the so
called “penumbra”: while we can often identify a core of cases which can clearly be classified
as belonging to the concept, there is a penumbra of hard cases, in which the membership
8 https://github.com/carneades/carneades
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of the concept can be disputed [49]. Moreover, not only does the world change, giving
rise to circumstances unexpected by the legislator who introduced the norm, but even the
ontology of reality can change with respect to the one constructed by the law to describe the
applicability conditions of norms. Consider, e.g., the problems concerning the application
of existing laws to privacy, intellectual property or technological innovations in healthcare.
To cope with unforeseen circumstances, the judicial system, at the moment in which a case
concerning a violation is discussed in court, is empowered to interpret, i.e., to change norms,
under some restrictions not to go beyond the purpose from which the norms stem.
5.4.1.2 Categories and Metaphors
Legal systems are the product of human mind and are then written in a natural language.
This implies two facts :
the basic processes of human cognition have to be taken into account when interpreting
norms;
as natural languages are inherently vague and imprecise, so are norms.
The application of laws to a new situation is a metaphorical process: the new situation is
mapped on to a situation in which applying law is obvious, by analogy. Here, by “metaphor”
we mean using a well understood, prototypical situation to represent and reason about a
less understood, novel situation. Metaphors are one of the basic building blocks of human
cognition [58].
Norms are written with references to categories. Take, for instance, Section 2 of the US
Marihuana Tax Act of 1937:
Every person who imports, manufactures, . . . , administers, or gives away marihuana
shall . . . pay the following special taxes . . .
This norm makes reference to concepts such as person, import, manufacture, administer,
and marihuana which may be described as categories of entities or actions. Applying this
norm to a particular case means recognising that a particular individual may be categorised
as a person, that what he/she does may be categorised as giving away something, and that
what he/she gives away may be categorised as marihuana.
As pointed out by Lakoff [57], “Categorisation is not a matter to be taken lightly. There
is nothing more basic than categorization to our thought, perception, action, and speech”.
The folk theory that categories are defined by common properties is not entirely wrong, but
it is only a small part of the story. It is now clear that categories may be based on prototypes.
Some categories are vague or imprecise; some do not have gradation of membership, while
others do. The category US Senator is well defined, but categories like rich people or tall
men are graded, simply because there are different degrees of richness and tallness. However,
it is important to notice that these degrees of membership depend both on the the context in
which the norm will be applied and on the goal associated with the norm. To be considered
tall in the Netherlands is not the same as to be considered tall in Portugal, for example. We
have than first to consider the context and than to consider the goal associated with the
norm. If the goal is context-dependent, both aspects can be considered at same time.
An effective and natural tool for formally modeling these phenomena is Fuzzy Logic,
which is indeed suitable to capture all the above issues related to categories. More precisely,
a category may be represented as a fuzzy set: the membership of an element to a category is
a graded concept. As a result, we get that a norm may apply to a given situation only to a
certain extent and different norms may apply to different extents to the same situation.
T. Balke et al. 23
5.4.1.3 Fuzzy Logic
As is well known, fuzzy logic was initiated by Lotfi Zadeh with his seminal work on fuzzy
sets [99]. Fuzzy set theory provides a mathematical framework for representing and treating
vagueness, imprecision, lack of information, and partial truth.
Very often, we lack complete information in solving real world problems. This can
be due to several causes. First of all, human expertise is of a qualitative type, hard to
translate into exact numbers and formulas. Our understanding of any process is largely
based on imprecise, “approximate” reasoning. However, imprecision does not prevent us
from performing successfully very hard tasks, such as driving cars, improvising on a chord
progression, or trading financial instruments. Furthermore, the main vehicle of human
expertise is natural language, which is in its own right ambiguous and vague, while at the
same time being the most powerful communication tool ever invented.
Fuzzy sets are a generalization of standard sets obtained by replacing the characteristic
function of a set A, χA which takes values in {0, 1} (χA(x) = 1 iff x ∈ A, χA(x) = 0
otherwise) with a membership function µA, which can take any value in [0, 1]. The value
µA(x) is the membership degree of element x in A, i.e., the degree to which x belongs in A.
A fuzzy set is completely defined by its membership function. Therefore, we can use it to
define the core and penumbra of normative concepts. Indeed, given a fuzzy set A, its core is
the (conventional) set of all elements x such that µA(x) = 1 while its support is the set of all
x such that µA(x) > 0.
Since a fuzzy set is completely defined by its membership function, the question arises
of how the shape of this function is determined. From an engineering point of view, the
definition of the ranges, quantities, and entities relevant to a system is a crucial design step.
In fuzzy systems all entities that come into play are defined in terms of fuzzy sets, that is, of
their membership functions. The determination of membership functions is then correctly
viewed as a problem of design. As such, it can be left to the sensibility of a human expert
or more objective techniques can be employed. Alternatively, optimal membership function
assignment, of course relative to a number of design goals that have to be clearly stated, such
as robustness, system performance, etc., can be estimated by means of a machine learning
or optimization method. In particular, evolutionary algorithms have been employed with
success to this aim.
The usual set-theoretic operations of union, intersection, and complement can be defined
for fuzzy sets as a generalization of their counterparts on standard sets. Likewise, in fuzzy
logic the set of true proposition and its complement, the set of false propositions, are fuzzy.
The degree to which a given proposition P belongs to the set of true propositions is its degree
of truth. Much in the same way, a one-to-one mapping can be established as well between
fuzzy sets and fuzzy predicates. In classical logic a predicate of an element of the universe of
discourse defines the set of elements for which that predicate is true and its complement, the
set of elements for which that predicate is not true. In fuzzy logic, by contrast, these sets are
fuzzy and the degree of truth of a predicate of an element is given by the degree to which
that element is in the set associated with that predicate.
5.4.2 Current Understanding and Open Challenges
Again, let b1, . . . , bn ⇒ l be a norm. We can represent each bi as a proposition of the form ‘x
is A’, where x is a variable and A is a category represented as a fuzzy set.
As in [17], we can assume that goals are assigned to norms. The role of such goals, which
can be context-dependent or not, is to pose the limits within which the interpretation process
Chapte r 01
24 Norms in MAS: Definitions and Related Concepts
of the judicial systems must stay when interpreting norms. As a consequence, the definition
of category changes: we have to consider the degree to which x belongs to a category A
with respect to the reason or goal behind the norm. Thus, a category can have as many
membership functions as the number of goals behind the norm. For example, let us consider
the following example in [17]: if x is a vehicle and y is a park, then it is forbidden for any x
to enter y. If the x is a bicycle and the goal of the norm is to limit air pollution, the degree
to which x belongs to the category “vehicle” should be different than in the case in which
the goal of the norm would be the “safety of kids walking in the park”.
5.5 Connections among the Research Topics
In this section we outline some connections among the topics presented in the previous parts
of Section 5. These links show what benefits each research line can offer to the others.
5.5.1 Moral Agency: Relations with the Other Topics
Group norms (Section 5.2) – There are different ways to explain the origin of moral
attitudes such as ideals, standards and values. Social scientists (see, e.g., [13]) have
defended the idea that there exist innate moral principles in human agents such as the
principle of fairness which are the product of biological evolution. Other ideals are the
product of the internalization of some external norm. A possible explanation is based
on the hypothesis that moral judgments are true or false only in relation to and with
reference to some agreement between people forming a group or a community. More
precisely, an agent’s ideals are simply norms of the group or community to which the
agent belongs that have been internalized by the agent.9 This is the essence of the
philosophical doctrine of moral relativism [47].
An interesting research direction for the NorMAS community is to provide models
clarifying the relationships between group norms and moral values.
Argumentation and norms (Section 5.3) – Morality also has interesting connections
with argumentation theory. For instance, it would be interesting to develop models
of argumentation in which agents may advance arguments supported by moral values,
standards or ideals (e.g. “Do not speak too loudly. It is unpolite.”).
5.5.2 Group Norms: Relations with the Other Topics
Argumentation and norms (Section 5.3) – When a group norm is violated or complied
with, sanctions or rewards associated with the norm should be distributed among group
members. A promising way to facilitate this is via argumentation: members would propose
a distribution (or just their own share of the reward or sanction) with its justification, and
engage in an argument. Typical justifications would be “I deserve a higher share of the
reward because I performed the most expensive individual action” or “You deserve more
blame because you failed to perform the cheapest/simplest of the actions”. Additionally,
it might be useful for an agent to belong to a group or not, so as to take advantage, for
instance, of permissions (which the agent would not otherwise have), or because other
members of the group will act in an attractive way (say, performing actions which the
agent would have to do otherwise). If a group specification is vague or may have different
interpretations (see also Section Section 5.4), then agents may engage in arguments
9 See [2] for a cognitive model of norm internalization.
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making a case towards or against their membership to a group. The two issues (blame
or praise apportioning and membership) merge when an agent is trying to make a case
against being blamed (and fined) because they do not belong to the group.
Moral agency (Section 5.1) – Group norms precisely define reference communities (namely,
the groups to which the norm applies) against which agents’ moral emotions can be
gauged. When a group norm is violated or complied with, then each agent should provide
her own assessment of her degree of blameworthiness or praiseworthiness with respect to
the group and her own contribution(s). The “other” parties from which admiration or
reproach stems are members of the group, expressing their opinions on other members of
the group. These two sources of opinion (namely, “self” and “others”) will inform the
blame/praise apportioning for sanctions/rewards.
Norms vs. policies (Section 4) – The differentiation between norms and policies is useful
in many ways. If research can provide a formal distinction between these concepts,
with precisely defined points of contact, then policies provide the design rationale of
norms10. For instance, a policy of “protecting minorities and their culture” may influence
or explain the design of the norm “a member of a minority may speak her own language
in court”. Policies addressing groups will give rise to group norms; if a group norm is
contested—agents may challenge the norm, asking why it should be complied with—-
then its policy is presented as the rationale.
Fuzziness of legal norms (Section 5.4) – In realistic settings, checking the membership of
a group may not be a clear-cut issue. For instance, an agent checking its membership of a
group such as “tall people” or “heavy equipment” could have degrees of truth, which can
be captured and studied with fuzzy interpretation techniques. Interestingly, the perceived
degree of membership to a group might inform the agent as to how much importance
the agent should give to the norm. Blame and praise apportioning among members of a
group, when a norm is violated or complied with, could make use of the agent’s perceived
degree of membership to a group.
5.5.3 Argumentation and Norms: Relations with the Other Topics
Moral agency (Section 5.1) – Moral agency may lead to an improvement of preference-
based argumentation, where the preferences are not simply assigned in the abstract way,
but they are grounded on the moral norms regulating the behaviour, and thus the way of
running argumentations, of the single agents.
Fuzziness of legal norms (Section 5.4) – Norm interpretation leads to new challenges
in argumentation theory, in particular the challenge is to go behind legal disputes by
seeing arguments as, for instance, alternative legal theories exchanged that define a same
concept and its scope, instead of single arguments, to assess their goodness.
5.5.4 Fuzziness of Legal Norms: Relations with the Other Topics
Moral agency (Section 5.1) – The moral aspects of an agent could be integrated in the
process of norm interpretation as a new and more specific component besides the context
and the goal associated to the norm. The fact that a same action receives different moral
evaluations may depend on a different ways in which this action is classified.
10These terms are used here following their meaning within the multi-agent systems research community.
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Group norms (Section 5.2) – The notion of belonging to a group of agents with respect to
a norm is introduced. In the presence of a norm, the agent has to decide if it is a member
of a group addressed/affected by the norm, that is, it has to interpret the legal meaning
of the norm.
Argumentation and norms (Section 5.3) – Argumentation-based persuasion could be used
in order to change the interpretation of a norm by an agent. For example, arguing about
different goals of norm categories means arguing about different membership functions
for those categories.
6 Summary
This chapter set the scene for nMAS by giving some definitions of norms and nMAS based on
common characteristics as well as pointing out requirements for nMAS. We presented three
views on nMAS: a social, a norm change and a mechanisms design one. We furthermore
discussed several guidelines for the development of nMAS proposed in [18, 19] and compared
them with some of the requirements for legal knowledge representation outlined in [38].
We assumed that norms are used to coordinate, organize, guide, regulate or control
interaction among distributed autonomous systems or entities; and that nMAS use these
norms to govern these systems using restrictions on patterns of behaviour of the agents in
the system.
The so-called “social science” definition looks at norms that are actively or passively
transmitted and have a social function and impact.
The so-called “norm-change” definition supports the derivation of those guidelines that
require to motivate which definition of normative multi-agent system is used; also, this
definition is meant to to make explicit why norms are a kind of soft constraints deserving
special analysis, and to explain why and how norms can be changed at runtime. The so-called
“mechanism design” definition entails the guidelines recommending to discuss the use and
role of norms as a mechanism in a game-theoretic setting and to clarify the role of norms in
the multi-agent system. The formal requirements of Gordon et al. [38] offer a complementary
analysis to the ones in [18, 19], as they provide a fine-grained account of the notions of norm
and normative system.
Finally, we considered in some detail four potential research lines concerning the nature of
nMAS: (i) the concept of moral agency, especially in a cognitive perspective, (ii) the concept
of group norm, (iii) the connection between argumentation and norms, and (iv) the role of
conceptual vagueness and fuzziness in norm interpretation and application.
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